龚鹏程x阿米蒂奇｜人类对战争有一种反常的自豪感

龚鹏程对话海外学者第九十八期：在后现代情境中，被技术统治的人类社会，只有强化交谈、重建沟通伦理，才能获得文化新生的力量CoinFit。这不是谁的理论，而是每个人都应实践的活动。龚鹏程先生遊走世界，并曾主持过“世界汉学研究中心”。我们会陆续推出“龚鹏程对话海外学者”系列文章，请他对话一些学界有意义的灵魂。范围不局限于汉学，会涉及多种学科。以期深山长谷之水，四面而出。

大卫·阿米蒂奇教授（Professor David Armitage ）

哈佛大学历史学教授

龚鹏程教授：您好CoinFit。您的《内战：思想中的历史》非常精彩。尤其是您谈到什么使战争成为 “内战”的想法，往往取决于发起者是统治者还是叛乱者、是胜利者还是被征服者、是受难者还是局外人。将一场冲突称为内战，可以决定外部大国是选择介入还是袖手旁观。在该书中，您还提到从1648年到1945年的三百年间构成了一个国家之间的战争时代，而过去60年的主要战争形式是国家内部的冲突。是什么原因导致了这种人为暴力的变化呢？我们可以做些什么来防止内战？

大卫·阿米蒂奇教授：龚教授，您好CoinFit。1648年和1945年是国家及其国际关系史上的常规日期，一个是指《威斯特伐利亚和约》，另一个是指第二次世界大战的结束。我不会把它们当作一个时代的结束挂在嘴边，只是说，由于成为了常规，它们向许多评论家表明了一个竞争性的国际秩序的兴衰，其特点是全球国家间的战争与和平，特别是在欧洲内部。

自1945年以来的几十年与之前的三个世纪越来越不一样的是，国家之间的战争逐渐被国家内部的战争所取代，成为有组织的大规模人类暴力的最典型形式CoinFit。

这种转变有很多原因，但有两个突出的原因CoinFit。

首先，在第二次世界大战之后，大国越来越多地致力于建立基于联合国等机构的国际秩序，以保障他们自己的利益，特别是在防止国家间冲突这方面的利益CoinFit。(当然，我们可以看到这当中各种各样的困难，尤其是对在过去被称为“第三世界”的国家之间输出暴力，以及一些明显的例外，如朝鲜战争和现在的俄罗斯入侵乌克兰)。

其次，国家利用其他手段，如代理人战争和 "特别行动 "等委婉说法，来掩盖他们正在进行的 "常规 "战争CoinFit。伴随着这些发展，特定政治社区的内部冲突激增，特别是在1989年之后。但其中许多冲突变得国际化，并吸引了外部势力：例如，伊拉克、阿富汗或也门。

展开全文

自1989年以来，几乎没有任何 "内战 "是纯粹的 "内战"，这一事实反过来导致了对改善、甚至预防内战的一种想象：首先在前南斯拉夫，由于《代顿协议》，以及最近在哥伦比亚和斯里兰卡，由国际机构斡旋和监督的谈判解决方案，已被证明是结束内战、以及在一定程度上抑制其再次发生的有效手段，但往往也都很脆弱CoinFit。

我曾说过，内战是人类的发明，而不是人类不可避免的组成部分：我们所发明的东西，我们可能需要推翻它CoinFit。

1648 and 1945 are of course conventional dates in the history of states and their international relations, the one referring to the Peace of Westphalia, the other the end of the Second World War. I wouldn’t hang too much significance on them as bookends of an era save to say that, by becoming conventional, they have indicated to many commentators the rise and fall of a competitive international order distinguished above all by interstate war and peace, especially within Europe but also globally. What marks the decades since 1945 as increasingly divergent from the preceding three centuries is the gradual replacement of war between states by war within states as the most characteristic form of organised mass human violence. There are many reasons for this shift—if that’s what it is—but two stand out. First, that in the aftermath of the Second World War, the great powers became ever more invested in crafting an international order based on institutions, such as the United Nations, that could safeguard their interests, not least their interest in preventing interstate conflict. (We can see all kinds of difficulties with that, naturally, not least the export of interstate violence to what used to be called the “Third World” and the obvious exceptions such as the Korean War and, now, the Russian invasion of Ukraine.) Second, states used other means, such as proxy wars and euphemisms such as “special operations”, to disguise or obfuscate their prosecution of “conventional” war. Alongside these developments, conflicts internal to particular political communities proliferated, especially after 1989, but many of them became internationalised and drew in outside powers: think of Iraq, Afghanistan, or Yemen, for instance. The fact that few, if any, “civil” wars since 1989 have been purely “civil” leads in turn to one way of imagining the amelioration, perhaps even the prevention of civil war: first in the former Yugoslavia, as a result of the Dayton Accords, and more recently in Colombia and Sri Lanka, negotiated settlements brokered and overseen by international institutions have proved to be one effective though often fragile means of ending civil wars and somewhat dampening the prospects of their recurrence. I have argued that civil war was a human invention not an inevitable part of our make-up: what we have invented, we might yet un-invent.

龚鹏程教授：您称罗马人是内战的发明者CoinFit。您可以解释一下这种说法？

大卫·阿米蒂奇教授：我说罗马人发明了内战，因为他们是第一个给它命名的人CoinFit。有了名字，这件事就更加清晰地进入人们的视野，对它的恐怖之处，以及对其特殊性、原因和后果有更清晰的认识。

显然，在罗马人之前，其他政体也曾遭受过大规模的内部冲突：正如我在书中早期指出的那样，希腊人—通常是指柏拉图、亚里士多德和修昔底德等雅典思想家—分析了他们自己的问题，但他们在讨论这些问题时，几乎完全用了我们可能会觉得不合时宜的民族主义术语，基于血缘的家庭冲突来讨论的CoinFit。

这是一个广义的概念领域，在希腊语中被称为停滞时期，而且现在仍然被称为停滞时期CoinFit。当罗马的历史学家、演说家和诗人来描述和解剖他们自己的内部斗争时，他们会以不同的方式看待它们：作为军事化的战争，就要拥有所有的战争装备，如将军、鼓和号角；作为针对特定敌人的战争，就像所有罗马人的战争一样，在这种情况下是针对同胞的，或者在拉丁语中是cives，“公民 (civil) ” 一词及其同义词如 “文明 (civilisation)” 和 “礼仪 (civility)” 就是来源于此。

因此是内战 (civil war)，或者再次在拉丁语中是bellum civileCoinFit。对罗马人来说，这是可以想象的最可怕的冲突形式：对他们来说，任何有价值的战争都必须与外部敌人作战，而罗马经历的一系列斗争显然是与罗马同胞作战，正是那些不可以（也不应该）被认做是敌人的人。

我们实际上不知道是谁最先想出了“内战”这个词，但在它已经很少出现后的一段时间里，它在公元前一世纪成为了主流，成为了罗马最具破坏性的，令人不安的，支离破碎的困境的代名词CoinFit。

这是一种很新奇的现象，但从西塞罗到奥古斯丁的罗马作家们都认为这是他们社会的特征：许多人现在认为，如果想要完全文明的国家，就容易发生内战，尽管他们也知道，他们的内部斗争与雅典人所遭受困境的大不相同CoinFit。

人类发明了战争，而并非是通过探索而知，对于这种可怕的暴力形式的发明，人们几乎有一种反常的自豪感CoinFit。

I say the Romans invented civil war because they were the first to give it a name. With a name, the thing came more sharply into view, in all its horror and with a much clearer sense of its specificity, its aetiology, and its consequences. Now obviously other polities had suffered large-scale internal conflict before the Romans: as I note early in my book, the Greeks—meaning, as usual, Athenian thinkers like Plato, Aristotle, and Thucydides—analysed their own conflicts but they discussed them almost exclusively in what we might anachronistically call ethno-nationalist terms, as familial conflicts based on blood. This is the broad conceptual field occupied by what in Greek was—and, indeed, still is—calledstasis. When Roman historians, orators, and poets came to describe and anatomise their own internal struggles, they viewed them differently: as militarised, with all the panoply of wars, such as generals, drums, and trumpets; as fought against a specific enemy, like all Romans wars, in this case against fellow-citizens, or in Latin cives, from which the word “civil” and its cognates like “civilisation” and “civility” derives; and therefore as civil war, or again in Latin, bellum civile. Now for the Romans this was the most terrifying form of conflict imaginable: for them, any bellum worth the name had to be fought against an external enemy, while the sequence of struggles Rome experienced was clearly battled out against fellow-Romans, precisely those who could (and should) not be thought of as enemies, or hostes. We don’t actually know who first came up with the phrase bellum civile but after a period when it appeared rarely and reluctantly, it became mainstream in the first century BCE as a self-description of Rome’s most destructive, disturbing, and shatteringly repetitive struggles. A new name had been needed for a phenomenon that was novel but one that Rome’s writers from Cicero to Augustine believed was characteristic of their society: to be civilised at all, many now thought, was to be susceptible to civil war, even though they also knew that their internal battles were quite different from those suffered by the Athenians. There was almost a perverse pride in having invented, rather than discovered, this form of terrible violence.

龚鹏程教授：您的《现代国际思想的基础》更是一部精彩的国际思想史，因为它清晰说明了“国际”思想是如何形成的CoinFit。您提到直到19世纪末，世界上大多数人都生活在帝国中，而当今的世界才被划分为国家。您是如何区分帝国和国家的？俄罗斯和乌克兰之间的战争可以被视为帝国主义的回归吗？

大卫·阿米蒂奇教授：众所周知，区分帝国和国家是非常困难的CoinFit。有些人甚至认为这是徒劳的，因为几乎任何用来定义帝国的元素同样可以分辨许多国家，反之亦然。

但我们暂且认为，帝国是有等级组织的政体，它将各种多样性—种族、宗教、近几个世纪的种族—悬挂在某种统一的结构中CoinFit。这种结构也可以有不同的定义，但它通常有一个位于等级制度顶点的关键人物，即皇帝，并且通常（虽然不总是如此）被赋予某种使命。

这个定义广泛用于19世纪末，包括从欧洲的海上帝国到欧洲大陆帝国的罗曼诺夫、哈布斯堡和霍亨索伦等的大多数帝国CoinFit。

国家---至少国家的形式会偶然地让我们联想到一个现代化的国家---并不一定是等级分明的，但它们往往会假定国家的统一，并通常从某种民族概念中正式派生出主权，并且很少有公开宣称的使命CoinFit。

我们都可以预想到这些定义的例外情况，以及跨越了帝国和国家之间界限的政体，或者是帝国特征仍然存在于国家结构或国家之间关系的例子，但广义地概括是存在的：在1945年之后我们可能会发现、在1900年左右参与联合国的 “国家”比现在少，也就是自从 让-贝德尔-博卡萨（Jean-Bédel Bokassa’s）的中非帝国在1996年覆灭后，没有任何政治实体会不假思索地称自己是帝国CoinFit。

至于俄罗斯对乌克兰的入侵是否可以被视为帝国主义的回归，我认为一个更可想象的例子是中国的新情况，例如对 “一带一路 ”的倡议，以及其在非洲的投资、财产购买和基础设施的建设模式CoinFit。

但是，那些历史学家认为弗拉基米尔·普京）（Vladimir Putin）决心追随凯瑟琳大帝（Catherine the Great）的脚步，而不是斯大林（Stalin）的脚步，在他们看来，普京是在努力让乌克兰这个的“小兄弟”与“老大哥”俄罗斯重新团结起来CoinFit。这些历史学家或许没有错，因为他们认为普京正在以一种咄咄逼人的现代形式复兴帝国活动。

Distinguishing between empires and states is notoriously difficult. Some might even call it a fool’s errand because almost any elements we might isolate to define an empire also distinguish many states—and vice versa. But let’s say for the moment that empires are hierarchically organised polities that suspend various kinds of diversity—ethnic, religious, in recent centuries racial—within some structure of uniformity that, again, can be variously defined but that often has a key figure at the apex of the hierarchy, an emperor, and is usually, though not always, endowed with some kind of universalistic mission. That unwieldy definition can be used broadly of the late nineteenth century to encompass most empires from the European saltwater empires to the European land empires of the Romanovs, Habsburgs, and the Hohenzollerns, for instance. States—at least the form of state contingently yoked to some idea of a nation that we associate with modernity—are not necessarily hierarchical, they often at least presume national uniformity, usually formally derive sovereignty from some conception of a people, and rarely have an avowed mission. We can all think of immediate exceptions to these definitions as well as polities that transgress the boundaries between empire and state, or instances where imperial features remain within the structure of states or their relations with one another, but the broad generalisation holds: what we might recognise as post-1945, post-United Nations “states” were fewer around 1900 than now, a time when no political entity has called itself an empire unironically since Jean-Bédel Bokassa’s Central African Empire ended in 1996. As to whether the Russian invasion of Ukraine can be seen as a return of imperialism, I would argue that a better example might be China’s neo-imperialism, through the Belt and Road Initiative in Asia or its patterns of investment, property purchase, and infrastructure building in Africa, say. But those historians who see Vladimir Putin as determined to follow in the footsteps not of Stalin but Catherine the Great in his efforts to, as he sees it, reunite the “little brother” of Ukraine with the “big brother” Russia may not be wrong in viewing him as engaged in an aggressively modern form of revived imperial activity.

龚鹏程教授：很多人都很想听您在哈佛的课程《给年轻领导者的建议》CoinFit，能为我们说说吗？

大卫·阿米蒂奇教授：我尽量不给我的 "年轻领袖 "提供太多自己的建议，但我让他们与那些过去曾为年轻领袖提供建议的人进行对话CoinFit。

开设这门课程是因为我们注意到，“西方”传统中有大量的关键文本是针对十几岁到二十五六岁的年轻人的 （其他传统也可以这么说）CoinFit。我想到的是西塞罗（Cicero）的《责任论》，是写给他21岁的儿子马库斯的信，塞内加（Seneca）的《仁慈论》是写给18岁的皇帝尼禄的，或者快进两千年，韦伯（Weber）的《当科学作为职业》和《当政治作为职业》或者弗吉尼亚·伍尔夫（Virginia Woolf）的《一间自己的房间》。

这些作品最初分别是在慕尼黑和英国剑桥，通过讲座教授学生的CoinFit。我让我的学生阅读这些经典著作，还有许多其他的经典著作，从柏拉图到玛雅·安杰洛（Maya Angelou），就好像年轻人在接受西塞罗或马基雅维利的建议，或者在听威廉·詹姆斯（William James）或弗吉尼亚·伍尔夫（Virginia Woolf）的讲座。然后我们讨论这些作者给出了什么样的建议，它是否与当下有关联，以及我们可以从他们的想法中学到什么。

从西塞罗（Cicero）那里，她们可能会学到世界大同主义以及与社会连接的品质；从韦伯（Weber）那里，她们可以了解到政治是多么具有挑战性；或者从伍尔夫（Woolf）那里，她们可以知道，一个女人，甚至任何艺术家，在强烈的传统意识支持下拥有自主权是多么重要CoinFit。

最重要的是，我给出的建议与莱纳-玛丽亚-里尔克（Rainer Maria Rilke）在我们经常阅读的一本书《致一位年轻诗人的信》中的建议相似CoinFit。”不要去寻找答案，那些答案现在还不能给你，因为你要自己经历，活出它们。 最重要的是要活出一切。 现在，就活出那些问题。 也许有朝一日，你会逐渐地，甚至不知不觉中，活出你的答案。 " 考虑到这一点，我希望我的学生能从我们的读物和他们的同学那里学到一些智慧，即使这些智慧不是来自他们的教授！"。

I confess I try not to give too much of my own advice to my “young leaders” but I let them engage in conversation with those who have advised young leaders in the past. The course arose from noticing that a remarkable number of key texts in the “Western” tradition were addressed to young people from their mid-teens to their mid-twenties. (The same could be said of other traditions, too.) I’m thinking here of Cicero’sOn Duties, written as a letter to his 21-year-old son Marcus, Seneca’s On Mercy, addressed to the 18-year-old emperor Nero or, fast-forwarding two millennia, to Weber’s Science as a Vocation and Politics as a Vocation or Virginia Woolf’s A Room of One’s Own, all of which were originally given as lectures to students in, respectively, Munich and Cambridge, England. I have my students read these classic works, and many others from Plato to Maya Angelou, as if they were the young people receiving advice from Cicero or Machiavelli or listening to lectures by William James or Virginia Woolf. We then discuss what kind of counsel those authors gave, whether it might be relevant today, and what we might learn from their ideas. From Cicero, they might take away the virtues of cosmpolitanism and attachment to one’s community; from Weber, how challenging the calling of politics can be, “drilling hard boards”; or from Woolf, how essential it is for a woman, or indeed any artist, to have autonomy backed by a strong sense of tradition. Above all, the advice I give is similar to Rainer Maria Rilke’s, in another of the books we often read, his Letters to a Young Poet: “Don’t look for the answers now: they cannot be given to you yet because you cannot yet live them, and what matters is to live everything. For now, live the questions.” With that in mind, I hope my students will carry some wisdom with them, from our readings and from their fellow students, if not necessarily from their professor!

龚鹏程，1956年生于台北，台湾师范大学博士，当代著名学者和思想家CoinFit。著作已出版一百五十多本。

办有大学、出版社、杂志社、书院等，并规划城市建设、主题园区等多处CoinFit。讲学于世界各地。并在北京、上海、杭州、台北、巴黎、日本、澳门等地举办过书法展。现为中国孔子博物馆名誉馆长、美国龚鹏程基金会主席。